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THE PLIGHT OF THE PASSIVE PAST
OWNER: DEFINING THE LIMITS OF
SUPERFUND LIABILITY
byJ. B. Ruhl*

HESE days, if you want to stir up high emotions in Congress, statehouses, corporate boardrooms or citizen group meetings, mention the
word Superfund. That alias for the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 19801 (CERCLA) evokes
strong reactions from industry, environmentalists, bankers, politicians, and
just about everyone else. CERCLA, a relative latecomer to the present-day
body of federal environmental law, was enacted in 1980 to fill a gap in then
existing law by creating the authority and liability for cleanup of abandoned
facilities contaminated with hazardous substances. In the short time it has
been with us, CERCLA has thrust the previously arcane subject matter of
environmental law into the day-to-day experience of the American economy
more than any other environmental statute.
One reason CERCLA gets so much attention is that its reach is so pervasive and its effect so drastic. Only a small club of statutes of any sort could
match the strength of CERCLA's liability provisions. The liability to governmental and private entities for cleanup of contaminated facilities is retroactive, strict, joint and several, subject to extremely narrow defenses, and
potentially very expensive. 2 Past activities which were perfectly legal at the
* Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski, Austin, Texas; Adjunct Professor of Law, University
of Texas School of Law; B.A. (1979), J.D. (1982), University of Virginia; LL.M. (1986),
George Washington University.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988)). CERCLA, also known as the Superfund after the tax-based fund established thereunder, was enacted in 1980 and substantially amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613. The legislative
history of the 1980 enactment is contained in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND)
(Comm. Print 1983) (Mark E. Anthony, author). This article does not provide a comprehensive overview of the legislative history, statutory provisions, and judicial interpretations of
CERCLA, as many such compilations have been published. See, Beverly Z. Alexander, CERCLA 1980-85: A Research Guide, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 311 (1987); Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA
Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 45 Bus. LAW. 923 (1990); Kyle E. McSlarrow, David
E. Jones & Eric J. Murdock, A Decade of Superfund Litigation: CERCLA Case Law from
1981-1991, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,367 (July 1991) [hereinafter A Decade of
Superfund]; Note, Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458
(1986).
2. See A Decade ofSuperfund, supra note 1, at 10,388-411 (thorough discussion of liabil-
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time they occurred can lead to present-day CERCLA liability. 3 Present activities which never before were thought to raise concern can lead to CERCLA liability. 4 Indeed, by the end of its first decade, CERCLA liability had
been interpreted by the Statute's principal implementing agency, the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the courts in ways so
broad and so evolving as to make most environmental attorneys loathe to
suggest that CERCLA liability could not attach in any particular set of
circumstances.
In the early 1990s, however, some reins have begun to be pulled on CERCLA, albeit in very small ways and only after tremendous public debate.
The administrative and legislative effort to define and limit the effect of
CERCLA on the lending industry provides a recent example. 5 Of course,
the fact that CERCLA has an effect on the lending industry illustrates the
power of the statute. Therefore, attention is raised when the statute's reach
is clipped, even at its edges.
One issue which has not been widely publicized yet, possibly because it is
so misunderstood, involves what could be called the passive past owner
(PPO). A PPO typically is someone who at one time owned, but who no
longer owns, a contaminated property and who neither knew of, contributed
to, nor exacerbated such contamination during its period of ownership.
Many PPOs have been startled to find themselves, years or even decades
after their ownership has terminated, included among the persons alleged
under CERCLA to be a potentially responsible party (PRP) liable for
cleanup of a contaminated site. In several cases a PPO has been held liable
notwithstanding uncontroverted evidence of the PPO's passive, unknowing
6
role in conditions at the site.
This Article examines the plight of the PPO. Part I provides a brief reity and defenses under CERCLA); Jane E. Lein & Kevin M. Ward, Private Party Response
Cost Recovery Under CERCLA, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,322 (June 1991).
3. The Department of Justice has explained its position that CERCLA liability can attach to waste disposers even when "a state has investigated a waste site, built disposal facilities
at the site, and told generators to dispose of their waste there." Letter from Phillip D. Brady,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of Justice, to Honorable Dan Glickman, Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations, United States House of Representatives 4 (Sept. 6,
1985), reprinted in Superfund Reauthorization: Judicial and Legal Issues, Oversight Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 241, 244 (1985) [hereinafter Judicial and Legal Issues].
4. The Department of Justice has explained its position that CERCLA holds "a party
strictly liable even if he shows he was as careful as possible given the existing level of information and technology." Judicial and Legal Issues, supra note 3, at 243.
5. In June 1991 the EPA issued a proposed rule for dealing with the complexities that
had been raised by courts interpreting the liability of lenders under CERCLA. 56 Fed. Reg.
28,798 (1991) (proposed June 24, 1991). For a discussion of the case law on lender liability
under CERCLA, see George Anhang, Cleaning Up the Lender Management Participation
Standard Under CERCLA in the Aftermath of Fleet Factors, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 235
(1991); Timothy R. Zinneclier, Lender Liability Under CERCLA and the Fleet-ing Protection
of the Secured Creditor Exemption, 44 Sw. L.J. 1449 (1991); Paula T. Perkins, Comment,
Abandonment in the Face of Possible Toxic Contamination: What's a Lender to Do?, 44 Sw.

L.J. 1563 (1991).
6. See discussion infra notes 22-42.

HeinOnline -- 45 Sw. L.J. 1130 1991-1992

SUPERFUND LIABILITY

1991]

1131

view of the statutory structure that makes PPO liability possible (but by no
means necessary) as a part of CERCLA's general liability scheme. As is the
case with other CERCLA liability issues, the central liability provisions of
CERCLA are so broad as to raise the question of PPO liability, yet are so
ambiguous as to leave the question open for interpretation. Part II of this
Article discusses how courts have interpreted that question, showing the decisions to be sharply divided and, in general, not particularly incisive. In
Part III several provisions of CERCLA added by the 1986 amendments to
the Statute, 7 which the courts have entirely ignored in addressing the PPO
issue, are analyzed for the manner in which they interrelate with the general
liability provisions and may thereby resolve the question. The conclusion is
that CERCLA as a whole requires that PPOs not be subjected to liability
without evidence of direct knowledge of or involvement in the contamination during the period of ownership.
I.

CERCLA

GENERAL LIABILITY PROVISIONS

CERCLA subjects specified governmental and private entities to liability
for their costs of remediating facilities contaminated with hazardous substances. A PRP may include:
the owner and operator of a ...

facility, [and] any person who at the

time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of ...

from

which there is release, or a threatened release which
causes the incur8
rence of response costs, of a hazardous substance.
7. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-

499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (amending CERCLA of 1980).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), (2), (4) (1988). With certain exceptions, an "owner or operator" is defined under CERCLA as:
(i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise,
such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any
person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, title
or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government,
any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand. Such term does not include a person, who, without
participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). An "onshore facility" is "any facility (including, but not
limited to, motor vehicles and rolling stock) of any kind located in, on, or under, any land or
nonnavigable waters within the United States." Id. § 9601(18). A "hazardous substance" includes the following:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B)
any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to
section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics
identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal
Act [42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1988)] (but not including any waste the regulation of
which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 1988] has
been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section
1317(a) of title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of
the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988)], and (F) any imminently hazardous
chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has
taken action pursuant to section 2606 of title 15. The term does not include
petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise
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The statute clearly divides owners of facilities at which a hazardous substance release requires a response into two categories: the present owner and
those who owned the facility at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance. Present owners may be liable regardless of whether any hazardous
substances are disposed of at the facility during the tenure of ownership only a release is necessary. By contrast, a past owner may be held liable only
if disposal took place during its tenure of ownership, regardless of whether a
release took place during that period.
specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs
(A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas,
natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or
mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
Id. § 9601(14). A "release" includes the following actions:
any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including
the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant), but excludes (A) any release which results in exposure to persons solely with a
workplace, with respect to a claim which such persons may assert against the
employer of such persons, (B) emissions from the engine exhaust of a motor
vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station engine, (C)
release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material from a nuclear incident,
as those terms are defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2296 1988], if such release is subject to requirements with respect to
financial protection established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under
section 170 of such Act [42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988)], or, for the purposes of section
9604 of this title or any other response action, any release of source byproduct,
or special nuclear material from any processing site designated under section
7912(a)(1) or 7942(a) of this title; and (D) the normal application of fertilizer.
Id. § 9601(22). Response costs are the costs of responding to a release of hazardous substances, which includes "removal" and "remedial action." Id. § 9601(25). A "removal" generally includes the following actions:
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment,
such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of
hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to
monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as
may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health
or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or
threat of release.
Id. § 9601(23). A "remedial action" generally includes the following:
those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition
to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous
substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or
future public health or welfare or the environment.
Id. § 9601(24). For a discussion of how the CERCLA cleanup and liability provisions are
administered, see A Decade of Superfund, supra note 1, at 10,367-88; William N. Hedeman,
Jonathan Z. Cannon, & David M. Friedland, Superfund Transaction Costs: A CriticalPerspective on the Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,413 (July 1991).
It is important to note that CERCLA does not pre-empt states from enacting similar or more
stringent remediation legislation. Such state laws thus may define the liability of past owners
differently than CERCLA. For example, the Texas hazardous substance facility remediation
statute applies to the person who "owned or operated a solid waste facility at the time of
processing, storage, or disposal of any solid waste." TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 361.211(2) (Vernon 1991). Though considerably broader than the CERCLA provisionprocessing and storage do not necessitate disposal and solid waste includes more than hazardous waste-the potential still exists for the PPO scenario to arise.
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Even on its face CERCLA exhibits its dependence on fortuity for defining
the scope of liability. It is not immediately apparent why the requirement of
disposal would be made for past owners, but not for the present owner.
Clearly, however, Congress meant to add that requirement for past owners,
as it would have been simple to combine present and past owners into one
liability provision had no distinction been intended. Some effect, therefore,
must be given to the "at the time of disposal" condition on past owner
liability.
A person who owned a facility prior to disposal of any hazardous substances at the facility clearly is excluded from liability. In that manner the
"at the time of disposal" condition operates to define the starting point in the
chain of title of potential liability. The owner at the time of the first disposal
event clearly is included as a PRP. All subsequent owners, except the present owner, must determine whether any disposal within the meaning of
CERCLA took place during their respective periods of ownership. Thus
arises the possibility of a PPO.
The determination of when a PPO exists depends largely on the meaning
9
of the term disposal as used in CERCLA. Section 101(29) of CERCLA
defines disposal by incorporating the definition provided in the Solid Waste
Disposal Act, known more commonly as the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA),10 which defines disposal as:
the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing
of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so
that such waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may
enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters, including ground waters. 1
To better understand what is included in disposal, it is useful to refer to
CERCLA's definition of release which includes all the acts and conditions
included in disposal, plus "escaping" and "leaching."' 12 There are several
possible interpretations of the effect of those additional criteria. On the one
hand, Congress may have meant nothing at all except to provide a more
comprehensive list of what generally constitutes release and disposal events.
But under that argument, one would have to accept that disposal and release
are equivalent, which is inconsistent with Congress' use of two distinct terms
in the first place. Hence, a more reasonable interpretation is one that gives
some meaning to Congress' choice of two separate terms and to the deliberately expanded category of events and conditions comprising release as opposed to disposal.
The latter interpretation offers the "passive" characteristic of the PPO.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (1988).

10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3).
12. CERCLA's definition of release includes "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the
environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed
receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant) ...." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(22) (1988).
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Escaping and leaching can and normally do occur without human action,
except for the initial action necessary to create the conditions which make
the escaping or leaching possible at a later time. By contrast, the events and
conditions included within disposal generally suggest human involvement.
Wastes do not "deposit" or "inject" themselves. Hence, it could be argued
that the distinction between disposal and release hinges upon whether the
event or condition in question is the result of direct human actions or is
occurring without such involvement. Disposal would include only the former; release would include both.
The preceding approach has its limitations, however, as some of the disposal criteria arguably could occur without direct human action. For example,
a buried drum could corrode years after being buried and only then be said
to be discharging or leaking, terms which clearly are encompassed under the
disposal definition. But those conditions also are associated with active
human involvement, unlike leaching and escaping. Overall, the fact that
Congress apparently felt the need to add escaping and leaching to the release
definition, neither of which is normally associated with direct human action,
indicates that the distinction between passive and active human involvement
was intended, though the intended effect may not be entirely clear.
Assuming Congress intended the statute to operate according to the foregoing distinction, the potential for PPOs is easily identified. For example,
assume that Owner A places hazardous waste into an earthen pit on Property and later conceals the pit. Without mentioning the pit, Owner A sells
Property to Owner B ten years later, who uses it as a mini-storage warehouse
business. Owner B sells Property to Owner C five years later, who intends to
develop Property as an office park. When excavating for the sub-surface
parking garage later that year, Owner C exposes the pit, which is discovered
to have been leaching hazardous constituents into ground water for at least
ten years.
Owners A and C clearly are PRPs under CERCLA. Owner A was the
owner at the time of disposal of a facility at which a release of a hazardous
substance is occurring. Owner C is the present owner of the facility at which
a release of a hazardous substance is occurring. But what of Owner B?
Owner B did not actively add to the hazardous substance at the facility, but
owned the facility during the period the pit began leaching a hazardous substance into ground water. Did Owner B own the facility "at the time of
disposal of any hazardous substances," or is Owner B outside the web of
CERCLA liability? Both the case law and, arguably, several provisions of
the 1986 amendments to CERCLA address that question. However, the
case law includes decisions which openly disagree as to the meaning of disposal under CERCLA, and the 1986 amendments offer only clues as to what
Congress may have intended.
II. THE CONFLICTING CASE LAW ON PPOs
A.

The R CRA Section 7003 Cases

Prior to enactment of CERCLA in 1980, the EPA attempted to force
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cleanup of several of the worst known contaminated sites under RCRA.3
Pursuant to the "imminent hazard" provision of section 7003 of RCRA,1
the EPA could bring suit in federal district court to immediately restrain any
person contributing to any "handling, storage, treatment, transportation or
disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste [that] may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 1 4 In the
absence of any broad cleanup authority such as CERCLA, the EPA relied
on the RCRA provision with limited success to achieve basically the same
objective.
The EPA's use of section 7003 ran head-on into many of the issues which
later were litigated ad nauseum in the early years of CERCLA.' 5 One such
issue was the reach of the disposal definition in cases where no ongoing ac-6
tive disposal conduct was alleged. For example, in United States v. Price,'
the EPA sued to force cleanup of an abandoned hazardous waste landfill at
which hazardous constituents were leaching into ground water. Among the
defenses raised was the argument that the defendants were not currently
contributing to any disposal because, as was uncontested, they were never
actively involved in the dumping that occurred at the landfill and they never
knew of the chemical wastes that had been dumped there until after they
purchased the property.17 The court rejected this argument by stating that
the gravamen of a section 7003 action was not the defendant's dumping8
practices but rather the imminent hazard created by the continued leaking. 1
The reasoning in Pricewas endorsed later in United States v. Waste Industries,19 in which defendants argued that the government could not use section 7003 to force cleanup of an abandoned landfill because of the lack of
any allegation of ongoing active disposal. The district court agreed, but the
court of appeals rejected that reasoning by construing the disposal definition
13. 42 U.S.C. § 6973.
14. Id.
15. For a discussion of the major issues litigated under CERCLA in the 1980s, see A
Decade of Superfund, supra note 1.
16. 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981).
17. Id. at 1070.
18. The court's reasoning was as follows:
The Government correctly observes that RCRA's definition of "disposal,"
one of the activities within the ambit of section 7003, is quite broad ....
Not only is this definition quite broad but, significantly, it includes within its
purview leaking, which ordinarily occurs not through affirmative action but as a
result of inaction or negligent past actions ....
That disposal need not result from affirmative action by the defendants but
may be the result of passive inaction. In brief, section 7003 does not mandate
the clean up of the ten years of leachate contamination that has emanated from
the landfill. It does, however, authorize Government suits to restrain the continued leaking of wastes in a manner that may present an imminent hazard to
the environment or to health ....

The gravamen of a section 7003 action, as we have construed it, is not defendants' dumping practices, which admittedly ceased with respect to toxic wastes in
1972, but the present imminent hazard posed by the continuing disposal (i.e.,
leaking) of contaminants into the groundwater.
Id. at 1071.
19. 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984).
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broadly to include leaking of hazardous wastes. 20 Subsequent section
7003
without question. 2 1

decisions followed Price and Waste Industries
Ironically, the RCRA section 7003 line of cases strained to allow RCRA
to reach what CERCLA had already covered by the time the cases were
decided. By doing so, however, they laid the seed for importing the now
broadly defined RCRA disposal term into CERCLA. Since these cases were
decided after CERCLA was enacted, it is unclear whether Congress would
have incorporated the RCRA definition of disposal into CERCLA had it
known how far the section 7003 cases would go. Hence, when the PPO issue
finally surfaced in CERCLA litigation, the confused history of the RCRA
disposal provision threatened to confuse the CERCLA outcome as well.
B. The CERCLA Cases
The first case in which the PPO issue was raised under CERCLA is the
only such case preceding the 1986 SARA amendments. In Cadillac
Fairview/CaliforniaInc. v. Dow Chemical Co. 22 the court granted a motion
to dismiss several of the defendants. The dismissed defendants were owners
of the property that was the subject of the cleanup only after Dow Chemical
and other previous owners had disposed of hazardous wastes on the property. The court relied on the following rationale:
This defendant argues on this motion that the scope of liability of the
Act is not so broad as to encompass a party who merely owned the site
at a previous point in time, who neither deposited nor allowed others to
to be correct under
deposit hazardous wastes on the site. This appears
23
any but a very strained reading of the Act.
The PPO issue was next raised under CERCLA, albeit indirectly, in Em20. The court concluded as follows:
[A] strained reading of that term limiting its section 7003 meaning to active
conduct would so frustrate the remedial purpose of the Act as to make it meaningless. Section 7003... does not regulate conduct but regulates and mitigates
endangerments ....

The inclusion of "leaking" as one of the diverse definitional components of
"disposal" demonstrates that Congress intended "disposal" to have a range of
meanings, including conduct, a physical state, and an occurrence. Discharging,
dumping, and injection (conduct), hazardous waste reposing (a physical state)
and movement of the waste after it has been placed in a state of repose (an
occurrence) are all encompassed in the broad definition of disposal. "Leaking"
ordinarily occurs when landfills are not constructed soundly or when drums and
tank trucks filled with waste materials corrode, rust, or rot. Thus "leaking" is
an occurrence included in the meaning of "disposal" ....
We must assume that Congress included "leaking" as a definitional component of "disposal" for a purpose. We conclude that Congress made "leaking" a
part of the definition of "disposal" to meet the need to respond to the possibility

of endangerment, among other reasons.
Id. at 164-65.
21. See United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1399-1400 (D.N.H.

1985).
22. 21 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108 (1985), rev'd on othergrounds, 840 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.
1988).
23. The court elaborated on its interpretation of CERCLA:
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hart Industries, Inc. v. Duracell International,Inc.,24 involving a suit by the
current owner of a contaminated battery manufacturing facility against the
former owner, Duracell. The evidence showed that during Duracell's tenure
on the site, PCB wastes were actively dumped and spilled on the facility
property, whence they leached into the groundwater. The active disposal
ceased prior to the current owner's tenure, but waste drums and underground tanks continued to leak, and those and earlier spills continued to
leach into the groundwater. The court found that the continued leaking and
leaching of wastes constituted a release of hazardous substances. 2 5 The
court, however, unnecessarily defined disposal broadly in addressing
Duracell's liability:
[T]he spilling of PCBs during their use by Duracell in the manufacturing process, as well as the dumping of PCBs outside the plant, the flow
of PCBs into the Green River, and the leaching of PCBs through the soil
and into the groundwater
during Duracell's ownership all constitute dis26
posal under CERCLA.
Clearly, Duracell's active conduct constituted disposal under even the narrowest interpretation of CERCLA; hence, the court did not have to address
the question of whether leaching also constitutes disposal. Presumably the
court did not appreciate the distinction, as Duracell was in no position to
portray itself as a true PPO.
The first case to decide the PPO question squarely under CERCLA was
In re Hemingway Transport, Inc.,27 a bankruptcy court case in which the
current owner of a contaminated industrial site sued the trustee of the bankrupt former owner, Hemingway, for recovery of response costs. The central
allegation was that a cache of leaking barrels had been disposed on the site
during the tenure of a former owner. There was no allegation or finding,
however, that Hemingway was the former owner who disposed of the drums
The only provision in CERCLA which imposes liability for cleanup and removal is 42 U.S.C., Section 9607, and it is under this section that plaintiff pro-

ceeds.
Section 9607(a) sets forth four classes of action liable under the Act for three
types of costs. This defendant fits none of these classes of potential defendant.

The only class which might conceivably include this defendant is Section
9607(a)(2) which reads, "Any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of."
Since this defendant is not alleged to be an owner at any time when the
disposals complained of were made, but is alleged to have merely owned the site
after such disposal and prior in time, to plaintiff's ownership, it cannot be liable
under the Act.
Plaintiff has argued that the section includes past as well as present owners
because no specification is made. However, none need be made because of the
express limitation provided by the words "at the time of disposal." Since this
defendant is not in that class, no cause of action under Section 9607 can be
stated against it.
Id. at 1113.
24. 665 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Tenn. 1987).
25. Id. at 574.
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. 108 B.R. 378 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989), aff'd, 126 B.R. 656 (D. Mass. 1991).
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or knew of their existence, or even that whoever disposed of the drums did
so during Hemingway's tenure; 28 rather, the leaking of the drums during
Hemingway's ownership was alleged to be sufficient basis for liability. 29 The
court agreed. 30 Drawing from the RCRA section 7003 cases, as well as from
the general body of CERCLA case law supporting broad application of the
statute, the court made the following conclusion:
Hemingway was an owner of the property at the time of disposal, and
that that time was co-extensive with the period of Hemingway's possession of the property ... as the drums, particularly those that were overturned and from which a tar-like substance was emerging, obviously
were deteriorating and thus "leaking"
due to their exposure to the ele31
ments over a period of years.
The court was unmoved by the fact that Hemingway had absolutely no
involvement in or knowledge of the leaking drums. Possibly, the court held
Hemingway culpable because it believed Hemingway should have known of
the drums; however, the court did not express that as a basis for liability and
even noted the difficulty of accessing the location of the drums from the
operations portion of the facility. 32 The lack of depth in the Hemingway
court's analysis leaves its basis for decision unclear.
A more incisive discussion of the PPO issue came later in Ecodyne Corp. v.
Shah,3 3 in which the seller of a contaminated water tower construction facility sued its purchaser and subsequent owners for recovery of response costs.
The seller, Ecodyne, owned and operated the facility at the time of the construction operation and had been required to remediate chromium waste
contamination resulting from its wood preservative process. Ecodyne sold
the property to Shah, who contractually assumed responsibility for the
remediation. The effect of the contract was litigated in state court; in federal
court, Ecodyne alleged that Shah was liable in any event under CERCLA
for contribution of Ecodyne's response costs because the chromium conditions at the property allegedly worsened during Shah's ownership as a result
34
of general migration of the pre-existing contamination.
Unlike the Emhart and Hemingway courts, the Ecodyne court was able to
free itself from the RCRA section 7003 cases and interpret the meaning of
28. Id. at 380.
29. Id. at 381.
30. Id. at 382.

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
108 B.R. at 380.
718 F. Supp. 1454 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
The court explained the issue as follows:
In nuce, [sic] defendants seek to dismiss this claim by contending that they did
not own or operate the property at any time when the disposal of chromium
occurred. Plaintiffs contend that defendants are liable because the general
movement and migration of the chromium on the property at the time defendants owned it is, by definition, a disposal. Thus, the outcome of this portion of
defendants' motion hinges on the meaning of the term "disposal" as it appears
in § 9607(a)(2).
Id. at 1456.
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disposal in the CERCLA context. 35 The Ecodyne court concluded that disposal could not encompass the PPO situation either as a matter of statutory
interpretation or policy. 36 The court reasoned:
To define disposal as plaintiff wishes would effectively make all property owners from the time a site became polluted (up to and including
the current owner) potentially liable under § 9607(a)(2) even if these
owners did not introduce the chemicals onto the site. Such a construction conflicts with the limited scope of § 9607(a)(2).
In sum, in an effort to provide a more temporal interpretation of
§ 9607(a)(2), this Court reads this provision as only providing an action
against prior owners or operators who owned the site at the time the
37
hazardous substances were introduced into the environment.
The split between Emhart and Hemingway on the one hand and Ecodyne on
the other was widened with two later PPO decisions.
In CPC International,Inc. v. Aerojet-GeneralCorp.38 the former owner of
contaminated property claimed that the Michigan Department of Natural
Resources (MDNR) could be held liable for response costs at the site because, contrary to an agreement it reached with one of the other former
owners, MDNR had failed to operate ground water purge wells designed to
remediate groundwater contamination at the facility. Although MDNR had
not disposed of any new wastes, MDNR's failure to operate the wells allowed the subsurface contamination to migrate into ground water and a
nearby creek, which constituted disposal under CERCLA. Relying on the

RCRA section 7003 cases and the dicta in Emhart, the CPC court reasoned:
MDNR does not offer any support for its assertion that there was no
35. The court's reasoning was as follows:
In arguing that the general movement and migration of the chromium constitutes a disposal under § 9607(a)(2), the plaintiffs primarily focus on the words
"discharge" and "leaking". Some Courts in examining these definitional components of the word "disposal" have concluded that Congress intended that disposal be given a relatively broad definition ....
However broad Congress may have intended the definition, Congressional intent does not justify the distortion [of] the statute. Therefore, instead of relying
on legislative history (an exercise unnecessary in this case), the Court will apply
sound principles of statutory and grammatical interpretation.
Id at 1456-57.
36. The Court determined the meaning of disposal as follows:
The meaning of a word is or may be known from the accompanying words this is the principle of noscitur a sociis. In ascertaining what disposal means, the
Court looks at its definitional components and find that these three nouns (discharge, deposit, and injection) and four gerunds (dumping, spilling, leaking, and
placing), when read together, all have in common the idea that someone do
something with hazardous substances. Taking the clearest example, the Court
notes that "placing", read in the context of the statute, means a person introducing - putting - formerly controlled or contained hazardous substances into
the environment. For plaintiff solipsistically to read, for example, "leaking" as
meaning the general migration of chemicals and, as such, a disposal under
§ 9607(a)(2), renders not only the definitional phrase of § 6903(3) "into or on
any land or water" superfluous, but would also conflict with the general structure of § 9607(a) ....
Id. at 1457.
37. Id.
38. 731 F. Supp. 783 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
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disposal at the Site during its period of operation. CERCLA defines
"disposal" as including "the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping,
spilling, leaking, or placing" of any toxic substance such that it "may
enter the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29).
Ample case law supports a broad interpretation of the term "disposal".
I am satisfied that the complaint adequately alleges that substantial pollutants "spilled" or "leaked" into the environment
during the period
39
that MDNR was an operator of the Site.
In sharp contrast, the Court in In re Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc.4 sided
with Ecodyne in a case against the trustee of the bankrupt former owner of a
contaminated manufacturing facility for contribution of response costs incurred by defendants in connection with the local municipality's CERCLA
cost recovery action. 4 ' The debtor alleged that it could not be held liable
because no disposal took place during its tenure, only migration of wastes
which had previously been disposed of on the property. 42 The court concluded that the reasoning in Ecodyne must apply:
Otherwise, the liability imposed by § 9607(a) could have been drafted to
simply include all owners or operators in the chain of title subsequent to
the contamination. However, while imposing strict liability, Congress
limited its imposition to certain persons who meet the specific requirements set forth at § 9607(a). Thus, the mere ownership of the site during a period of time in which migration or leaching may have taken
place, without any active disposal activities, does not
bring Reo Proper43
ties within the liability provision of § 9607(a)(2).
The case law thus remains sharply divided over the fate of PPOs under
CERCLA. The cause of this disagreement appears to be the differing treatment each court gives to the early judicial interpretations of the RCRA section 7003 concept of disposal. Those cases, however, involved efforts of the
government to bend RCRA section 7003 to fit what later would be CERCLA cases. Those courts may have strained RCRA beyond its intended
bounds; on the other hand, without such interpretation the government
would have been powerless to address seriously contaminated facilities until
passage of CERCLA. Ironically, the RCRA cases were not decided until
after CERCLA was passed, meaning that Congress could not have known of
the implications those decisions would later have for CERCLA section
107(a)(2). The urgent and unusual circumstances surrounding the RCRA
cases should caution courts to avoid transporting the RCRA disposal definition into CERCLA section 107(a)(2) without assessing Congress' intended
structure for its principal remedial statute.

III.

DECIPHERING THE

1986 AMENDMENTS

Several provisions of the 1986 CERCLA amendments were intended to
39. Id. at 789 (citations omitted).
40. 115 B.R. 559 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990).
41. Id. at 565.

42. Id
43. Id
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rescue PRPs from what by then had come to be perceived as inequitable
effects of the general liability provisions. 44 Two such provisions bear upon
the PPO issue, albeit indirectly. The first involves Congress' attempt to clarify the so-called third party defense to CERCLA liability set forth in section
107(b)(3). The second added discretionary authority for the EPA to enter
into settlements with PRPs whose involvement at the facility, while sufficient to impose PRP status, was so insignificant as to make the CERCLA
policy of joint and several liability with the major PRPs grossly unfair.
A. The Third Party Defense Provision
Section 107(b)(3) of CERCLA provides PRPs a defense where it is shown
by a preponderance of the evidence that the release was caused solely by:
an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of
the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection
with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the
defendant (except where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a
published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by
rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b)
he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such
that could foreseeably result from
third party and the consequences
45
such acts or omissions.
From the beginning it was clear this defense would rarely be available given
its conditions and exceptions. The effect of the contractual relationship exception to the defense as interpreted by the courts was to nearly eradicate
available only to the
any defense at all, leaving it for all practical purposes
46
bystander.
innocent
the
of
equivalent
CERCLA
Congress attempted in the 1986 amendments to clarify the contractual
relationship exception at least with respect to contracts for the transfer of
title of the facility. The resulting definition of contractual relationship, now
set forth in section 101(35),47 has taken on a life of its own as the so-called
innocent purchaser defense. Rather than clarifying anything, however, the
definition is so utterly convoluted as to be almost ineffective except in striking fear into the hearts of property purchasers.
The contractual relationship definition begins by including land contracts
within the definition of contractual relationship "unless the real property on
which the facility concerned is located was acquired by the defendant after
the disposal or placement of the hazardous substances on, in, or at the facil44. These perceived inequities were a major focus of legislative deliberations on the 1986
amendments. See Judicialand Legal Issues, supra note 3.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988).
46. See J. B. Ruhi, The Third-PartyDefense to Hazardous Waste Liability: Narrowingthe
ContractualRelationship Exception, 29 S. TEX. L. REv. 291 (1988).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35).
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ity. '' 4s That is a somewhat perplexing beginning from the standpoint of the
PPO issue. Does it imply that a subsequent purchaser who engages in no
active disposal, a true PPO, could be a PRP and thus must seek the harbor
of the defense; or does it merely confirm that a true PPO has no reason to
require the defense since it is not a PRP in the first place?
Two additional conditions on the post-disposal purchaser clause imply the
former interpretation, at least on their faces. The first states that the defendant also must show that "[a]t the time the defendant acquired the facility the
defendant did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous
substance which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility." 49 A true PPO should be able to meet this
condition. But another condition requires further that "[t]o establish that
the defendant had no reason to know... the defendant must have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous
ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability." 50 Many PPOs, particularly those in the chain of title before such appropriate inquiry became
common practice, could not satisfy this condition.
Taken as a whole, the innocent purchaser provisions do not make sense
within the broader context of CERCLA as far as the PPO issue is concerned.
A past owner should not need the benefit of the defense in section 103(b)(3)
unless it otherwise would be a PRP under section 107(a)(2). The conditions
apparently placed on the ability of a PPO to escape liability in sections
101(35) through 103(b)(3), suggest that PPOs must be PRPs under section
107(a)(2). But if that is so, the distinction between present owners in section
107(a)(1) and past owners in section 107(a)(2) would be unnecessary, as section 101(35) would provide the distinction through the definition of the defense. Hence, perhaps section 101(35) is directed at defining the defense
conditions only for present owners, who, after all, can be liable without evidence of a disposal during the period of ownership.
The latter interpretation appears consistent with both the continuation in
section 101(35) of the distinction between disposal and release raised in section 107(a)(2), and with yet another condition in section 101(35) relating
specifically to previous owners. Section 101(35)(C) suggests that the preceding clauses of section 101(35) address only present owners by stating:
Nothing in this paragraph or in section 9607(b)(3) of this title shall
diminish the liability of any previous owner or operator of such facility
who would otherwise be liable under this chapter. Notwithstanding
this paragraph, if the defendant obtained actual knowledge of the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at such facility
when the defendant owned the real property and then subsequently
transferred ownership of the property to another person without disclosing such knowledge, such defendant shall be treated as liable under
section 9607(a)(1) of this title and no defense under section 9607(b)(3)
48. Id. § 9601(35)(A).
49. Id. § 9601(35)(A)(i).
50. Id. § 9601(35)(B).
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of this title shall be available to such defendant. 5 1
After all, a past owner who owned the facility at the time of disposal is not a
PPO and could never qualify for the defense under section 101(35) anyway.
Present owners, however, can be liable under section 107(a)(1) without evidence of disposal during the period of ownership, and hence section 101(35)
comes to the rescue for the innocent present owner. PPOs, on the other
hand, shouldn't need the protection of sections 107(b)(3) and 101(35) in the
first place. Hence, section 101(35)(C) may be a warning to PPOs that their
protected status can be lost through gaining knowledge of a release and failing to pass that knowledge to the subsequent purchaser. Viewed any other
way, section 101(35) fails to harmonize all the liability provisions of
CERCLA.
B.

The De Minimus Settlement Provision

A similar conclusion is more emphatically compelled under the so-called
de minimus settlements provision in section 122(g)(1), which provides:
Whenever practicable and in the public interest, as determined by the
President, the President shall as promptly as possible reach a final settlement with a potentially responsible party in an administrative or civil
action under section 9606 or 9607 of this title if such settlement involves
only a minor portion of the response costs at the facility concerned and,
in the judgment of the President, the conditions in either of the following subparagraph (A) or (B) are met:
(A) Both of the following are minimal in comparison to other hazardous substances at the facility:
(i) The amount of the hazardous substances -contributed by that
party to the facility.
(ii) The toxic or other hazardous effects of the substances contributed by that party to the facility.
(B) The potentially responsible party(i) is the owner of the real property on or in which the facility is
located;
(ii) did not conduct or permit the generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous substance at the facility; and
(iii) did not contribute to the release of a hazardous substance at
the facility through any action or omission.
This subparagraph (B) does not apply if the potentially responsible
party purchased the real property with actual or constructive knowlstoredge that the property was used for the generation, transportation,
52
age, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous substance.
This provision makes no sense if PPOs are liable under section 107(a)(2). A
true PPO could meet the conditions of subsections (B)(ii) and (B)(iii); however, section (B)(i) would exclude PPOs since it applies only to the owner of
the facility, i.e., the present owner. Thus, PPOs would be inexplicably rele51. Id. § 9601(35)(C).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (1988).
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gated to the subparagraph (A) conditions, which makes no sense: why
would PPOs proceed under section (A) and only present owners proceed
under subsection (B)? Like section 101(35)(C), section 122(g) suggests that
a PPO is not a PRP unless the PPO obtains knowledge of the release and
fails to pass that knowledge along.
Although they do not squarely address the PPO issue, the contractual
relationship and the de minimus settlement provisions of the 1986 amendments to CERCLA strongly suggest that Congress did not intend for section
107(a)(2) to mean that a true PPO could be held liable.5 3 The structure of
the amendatory provisions is inconsistent with the interpretation that PPO
liability can attach for mere leaching of wastes disposed of prior to and without knowledge of the PPO's tenure on the site. By contrast, the statutory
framework as a whole is harmonized by construing section 107(a)(2) as not
imposing PPO liability.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The issue of PPO liability is but one of many dusty corners of CERCLA,
but it is a serious matter nonetheless. The uncertainty which would be
caused for countless past property owners if PPOs could be held liable is
unjustified given the entirely innocent, non-causal role of a true PPO. Indeed, the origin of PPO liability, apart from the ambiguous nature of CERCLA itself, is the transport of the RCRA section 7003 disposal concept into
section 107(a)(2). The RCRA cases, however, involved parties who clearly
would have been liable under CERCLA as present owners or operators or as
disposers - none could have established PPO status. To use those cases to
decide the PPO issue under CERCLA thus mixes apples and oranges
notwithstanding the fact that the same definitional language applies.
The courts, even those deciding that PPOs are not liable under CERCLA,
appear to have forgotten about the origin of the RCRA section 7003 cases
and have overlooked the inappropriateness of using that line of decisions to
decide the CERCLA question. The courts also have generally ignored the
provisions of CERCLA, other than section 107(a)(2), that suggest PPO liability was not intended. Yet, notwithstanding the rather superficial level of
analysis, some courts have muscled their way through the issue to get to the
better result - no PPO liability. Other courts, however, have decided the
issue incorrectly, and no clear message from Congress or a higher court appears imminent. Hence, for the time being, PPO liability under CERCLA
remains a hit-or-miss proposition with stakes higher than most avid gamblers would care to bet on.

53. The legislative history is silent on Congress' intent with respect to the PPO issue. See
Judicial and Legal Issues, supra note 3.
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